Thoughts on the Hamas Victory.

1. The actual elections seem to have been fair. The electoral system adopted, half the seats being first-past the-post constituency seats and half a proportional representation list, with a certain number of candidates on the list having to be women, was as good a system as could be devised, and the only genuinely democratic voting system in the Arab Middle East.

2. There are a number of ironies in the result:

The Western world had been calling for democracy in the Middle East. Some people have long foretold that the result would be a radicalization of the political scene, governments which will be more active in their hostility to Israel and to the West, and very likely more Islamicist. The result in Palestine will be a huge encouragement for and strengthening of the democratic but also Islamicist opposition in the less democratic countries in the Arab world.

It appears that the main reason for the Hamas victory was that it was perceived as less corrupt than Fatah. It is doubtful whether many of the voters, while firm in their resistance to the Israeli occupation, acutally want the violence to escalate still further, with all the additional suffering that would mean for the Palestinians. One also wonders whether more than a minority of Hamas voters would want the Sharia to be the basis of a Palestinian legal system, with all that is likely to mean for women, for secularists, and for freedom of expression.

3. Possible scenarios for the future:

a) Although at present the rhetoric on both the Hamas and the Israeli side is that they will not talk to each other, this will have to be abandoned by both sides sooner rather than later: they are so dependent on each other (though unequally so) that both will be compelled to do that. Though for the Quartet the compulsion is not so great or so immediate, it is even more certain that the Quartet, too, will talk to Hamas, whether or not Hamas abandons violence.

b) That is not to say that the Peace Process would be advanced when such contact is established. Even the minimum demands of the two sides are totally irreconcilable, and no resolution is in sight for the foreseeable future. Any unoffical truce that may be established will therefore be extremely unstable.

c) If the West thinks that it has some hold on Hamas because of the financial aid it has been giving to the Palestinians, it is fooling itself. The Iranians certainly and Saudi circles probably will be willing to pour money, arms, and fighters into Hamas Palestine. They had never been keen on the secular-minded PLO.

d) This could mean that in a very short time a Hamas-led Palestine will much more of a military threat to Israel than the PLO ever was. The Wall will not keep out the kind of weaponry which will soon be available to the Palestinians.

e) It is possible that in there will be a civil war among the Palestinians. The armed men and the security apparatus of Fatah may not readily agree to put themselves under Hamas control or to dissolve themselves. They have much to lose and perhaps much to fear. And there are some pretty thuggish and out-of-control elements in Fatah.

f) There may also be splits in Hamas between the pragmatists and the zealots. Hamas already talks with two voices, and it remains to be seen whether that reflects the reality or is a tactical manoeuvre. And in any case there is always Islamic Jihad in the wings: pragmatists in Hamas will not want to lose the zealots in their ranks to Islamic Jihad.

g) The effect on the forthcoming Israeli elections is uncertain. The Israeli public is in a most unenviable situation: the great majority of Israelis know that they will have to make concessions, if perhaps unilateral ones. That accounts for the current strong position of Kadimah in the polls. On the other hand, they also know that no concessions that they think they can realistically make will be enough to bring peace with the Palestinians any nearer, and they must therefore feel sure that any further unilateral concessions will, if not strengthen, at least not weaken them. The Likud's line is that concessions made in Gaza have already weakened Israel, have encouraged Palestinians to think that it was their armed resistance that has driven the Israelis out of Gaza, and that this very fact has contributed to the Hamas victory in the elections. The Likud may therefore gain in strength between now and polling day.